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Abstract
This special issue of the journal Fascism draws its inspiration from recent developments 
in the research areas of war studies, cultural history of the First World War,  research on 
political culture and on (international) civil society in historical  perspective. It aims to 
review the approaches and considerations of recent studies about World War veterans 
and their veterans’ organisations for selected European countries in the interwar pe-
riod. The articles in this themed issue will contribute to an improved insight into the 
history of fascism and the backgrounds of fascist movements. This  introduction will 
present the general direction of the themed issue and a broad outline of the dominant 
questions and concerns. It presents recent developments across a broad range of new 
approaches and perspectives on the history of the interwar period, before outlining 
the research area of veterans’ organisations and the general questions and problems 
which this themed issue will be considering.
Keywords
Europe – veterans – fascism – First World War – commemoration culture –  brutalisation – 
cultural demobilization
Although the problem of reintegrating former combatants after the signing of 
an armistice or peace treaty poses itself for each war and for each post-war 
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society, the case of the First World War and its veterans deserves particular 
attention.1 First of all, the Great War as the ‘seminal catastrophe of the 20th 
century’2 exerted a massive influence on the political, social, economic, and 
cultural history of both belligerent and neutral states. Secondly, the outcome 
of the First World War and the fate of its veterans are often discerned as major 
factors in the rise of a new political movement: fascism.
The direct connection between the veterans of the First World War and 
the rise of fascism was already invoked by the propaganda of Italian Fascism, 
German National Socialism, and other fascist movements throughout Europe. 
Mussolini and Hitler appealed to the ‘martyrs’ of the First World War and to 
the ‘trench experience’ as a mystic background and legitimation of their move-
ments’ ideological basis.
The historiography of Fascism and National Socialism has traditionally fol-
lowed the assumption that military defeat in the Great War and the humiliat-
ing terms of the armistice and the peace treaties were important factors in 
the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy. Allegedly the returning war veterans 
could not adjust to civilian life, developed a deep distrust for traditional politi-
cal parties, contributed to a profound militarisation of post-war societies, and 
became trailblazers for right-extremist movements.3 However, the cultural his-
tory of the First World War itself, the war experience, social composition and 
political perspectives of war veterans themselves has been relatively  neglected 
in accounts of the rise of fascism. These factors were selectively taken into 
 account as a part of the explanation for the rise of National Socialism, but were 
in most cases not considered in the context of the larger cultural environment, 
political culture, and civil society of the time.4
1 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Christophe Prochasson, ed., Sortir de la Grande Guerre : 
Le  monde et l’après-1918 (Paris: Tallandier, 2008); Benjamin Bieber, Wie Kriege enden: Die 
 Reintegration von Soldaten in Nachkriegsgesellschaften (Hamburg: Kovač, 2002); Jörg  Duppler 
and Gerhard Paul Gross, ed. , Kriegsende 1918: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung (Munich: 
 Oldenbourg, 1999).
2 George Frost Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 
1875–1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.
3 Jürgen Falter, Hitlers Wähler (Munich: Beck, 1991); Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and 
Jan Petter Myklebust, ed., Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: 
Universitetsförlaget, 1980); Peter Hans Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 early 
Nazis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbed-
ingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 
2003).
4 Gerd Krumeich, ‘Nationalsozialismus und Erster Weltkrieg: Eine Einführung,’ in Nationalso-
zialismus und Erster Weltkrieg, ed. Gerd Krumeich (Essen: Klartext, 2010), 11–20.
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 Research Perspectives: Cultural History of War
New research approaches in the last thirty years have taken the First World 
War and the experience and perceptions of combatants and civilians as a start-
ing point. These new perspectives contributed to a ‘cultural history of war’ and 
introduced aspects of cultural history, gender, ‘body politics’, and discursive 
elements into the historiography of the First World War.5 Some of these con-
cepts and theoretical perspectives were successfully applied to the interwar 
period.
Studies on war propaganda and enemy discourses in France and Germany 
used the concept of a ‘culture of war’, which was typically characterised by de-
humanising images of the war enemy, chiliastic representations of a battle be-
tween ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and the heroisation of soldiers, patriotism, self-sacrifice 
and comradeship.6 Following on this concept, John Horne pointed to the lack 
of a ‘cultural demobilisation’ after 1918. In the aftermath of the First World War, 
discursive practices did not follow the more or less successful  military, political, 
and economic demobilisation processes. Wartime enemy images and reflexes 
persisted and included the refusal to accept responsibility for the outbreak of 
the war or even the mere fact of military defeat. The new international politi-
cal culture of peace, reconciliation, and conference diplomacy, connected to 
the new League of Nations in Geneva, was rejected outright or at least severely 
distrusted.7
George Mosse focussed on domestic developments in the interwar period 
and identified the issue of the ‘brutalisation’ of postwar society. According 
to this ‘brutalisation thesis’, military values, methods, and attitudes of order, 
5 Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl, ed., Die Erfahrung des Krieges: Erfahrungsgeschich-
tliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2001); Anne Lipp, ‘Diskurs und Praxis: Militärgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte,’ in 
Was ist Militärgeschichte? ed. Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2000), 211–227; Benoît Majerus, ‘Kriegserfahrung als Gewalterfahrung: Perspektiven der 
neuesten internationalen Forschung zum Ersten Weltkrieg,’ in Der Bürger als Soldat: Die 
Militarisierung europäischer Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert: ein internationaler Ver-
gleich, ed. Christian Jansen (Essen: Klartext 2004), 271–297.
6 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Anette Becker, ‘Violence et consentement : La “culture de 
guerre” du premier conflit mondial,’ in Pour une histoire culturelle, ed. Jean-Pierre Rioux and 
Jean-François Sirinelli (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997), 251–271; John Horne, ‘Introduction,’ 
14–18 Aujourd‘hui – Today – Heute 5 (2002): 45–53; John Horne, ed., State, Society and Mobiliza-
tion in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
7 John Horne, ‘Locarno et la politique de démobilisation culturelle: 1925–1930,’ 14–18 
Aujourd’hui – Today – Heute 5 (2002): 72–87.
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 discipline, and command lines returned home with the demobilised war vet-
erans and disrupted the civil standards of peacetime society and the will to 
adhere to democratic procedures and find political compromises. Because so-
ciety had become used to a certain level of physical and verbal violence, it 
could  consider political violence in the streets and venomous propaganda as 
‘normal’.8 For part of British, French, and Italian soldiers, the experience of pro-
tracted war and violence in a colonial context after 1918 might also account for 
their turn towards authoritarian or fascist ideological principles.9 Robert Ger-
warth convincingly argued that the genocidal logic of the excessively violent 
conflicts in Eastern and East Central Europe after 1918 serves as a more plau-
sible explanation of ‘brutalisation’ than the First World War itself, and were a 
prelude to the continuing tensions in this region through the twentieth centu-
ry.10 In many European countries, military leaders aspired to political promi-
nence: Alexandru Averescu (briefly) became Prime Minister of Romania; Józef 
Piłsudski and Philippe Pétain both became state president when the political 
order in their respective countries was in danger. They were supposed to safe-
guard the state from the onslaught of extremist movements, but by doing so 
paved the way for more ‘disciplined’ and authoritarian forms of government.11
8 George Lachmann Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the Two World Wars 
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 159–181; Jon Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable 
 Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First World War Britain,’ The 
Journal of Modern History 75 (2003): 557–589; Antoine Prost, ‘Brutalisation des sociétés 
et brutalisation des combattants,’ in Les sociétés en guerre 1911–1946, ed. Bruno Cabanes 
and Édouard Husson (Paris: Armand Colin, 2003), 99–111; Dirk Schumann, ‘Europa, der 
Erste Weltkrieg und die Nachkriegszeit: Eine Kontinuität der Gewalt?’ Journal of Modern 
European History 1 (2003): 24–43.
9 Caroline Campbell, ‘The Colonial Roots of Political Violence in France: The Croix de 
Feu, the Popular Front and the Riots of 22 March 1936 in Morocco,’ in Political Violence 
and  Democracy in Western Europe, 1918–1940, ed. Chris Millington and Kevin Passmore 
 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 127–143; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Transnationale 
Geschichte – Der neue Königsweg historischer Forschung?’ in Transnationale Geschichte: 
Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad and Oliver Janz 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 161–174.
10 Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923 
 (London: Allen Lane, 2016).
11 Giovanni Capoccia, Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe 
(Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Peter Fritzsche, ‘Presidential 
Victory and Popular Festivity in Weimar Germany: Hindenburg’s 1925 Election,’ Central 
European History 23 (1990): 205–224; Chris Millington, From Victory to Vichy: Veterans in 
Interwar France (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).
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Last but not least, John Horne introduced the concept of ‘the culture of 
 victory’ for the former Entente powers, to complement Wolfgang Schivelbus-
ch’s term  ‘culture of defeat’, which would particularly apply to interwar Ger-
many.12  Because France, Great Britain, and other Allied and associated states, 
on one hand, had won the war, veterans could count on a certain level of ap-
preciation and admiration in their home societies. The public discourse about 
war and the central function of war commemoration ceremonies conferred an 
honourable meaning to the experience, suffering and death of soldiers in the 
trenches. German society, on the other hand, had to cope with the memory of 
wartime defeat and with the blame of starting the war. The German ‘culture of 
defeat’ and German endeavours to revise the Versailles peace treaty dominated 
both foreign and domestic policy during the Weimar Republic.13 Italy formally 
belonged to the victor powers. However, the fact that the country remained 
neutral until 1915 and the traumatic defeat at Caporetto in 1917, which domi-
nated the Italian war experience, contributed to the emergence of a ‘culture of 
defeat’ directly after the war. The war veterans, especially the former arditi, and 
the minimal spoils of the war effort were instrumentalised for domestic po-
litical purposes and for a foreign policy which aimed at revising the so-called 
 ‘vittoria mutilata’ after the Paris peace treaties.14
The macro perspective of culture, society, and discursive narratives of war 
and peace is complemented by a focus on the social and economic aspects of 
the demobilisation process. One of the crucial questions concerning the roots 
and origins of fascist movements, the successful reintegration of war veterans 
in the labour market and in prewar social and economic structures, can hardly 
be answered unequivocally. This heavily depended on the age cohort, fam-
ily situation, and the regional and religious background of the combatants.15 
12 John Horne, ‘Defending Victory: Paramilitary Politics in France, 1918–1926: A Counter-
Example,’ in War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War, ed.  Robert 
Gerwarth and John Horne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 216–233; Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch, Die Kultur der Niederlage: Der amerikanische Süden 1865, Frankreich 1871, 
Deutschland 1918 (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007).
13 Boris Barth, Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen 
Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914–1933 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003).
14 Patrizia Dogliani, ‘Sortir de la Grande Guerre, entrer dans le fascisme: le cas italien’, in 
 Sortir de la Grande Guerre, 113–138; Mark Jones, ‘From Caporetto to Garibaldiland: 
 Interventionist War Culture as a Culture of Defeat,’ European Review of History 15 (2008): 
659–674; Marco Mondini, ‘La festa mancata: I militari e la memora della Grande Guerra, 
1918–1923’, Contemporanea 7 (2004): 555–578.
15 Dominique Fouchard, Le poids de la guerre : Les poilus et leur famille après 1918 (Rennes: 
Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2013); Adam R. Seipp, The Ordeal of Peace :  Demobilization 
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The ‘brutalisation thesis’ suggests that the reintegration of war veterans failed 
after 1918, and that their wartime habits dominated postwar society. Their po-
litical activity and their influence on political culture in the interwar period 
prepared or at least facilitated the rise of fascist mass movements, according 
to this thesis.
 Research Perspective: Veterans’ Organisations
In order to determine and analyse the political and civil society activity of war 
veterans, veterans’ organisations as key collective actors have received more 
attention in recent years. They were the subject of the workshop ‘Veteran 
 Internationalism and the Cultures of Victory and Peace (1919–1933)’, in  Dublin 
in October 2009,16 and of the conference ‘Veterans or Socialists? Socialism 
and Militarism in the Nationalist and Protofascist Movements and Regimes 
(1918–1945)’ in Trento in May 2012.17 These conferences and the publications 
that they yielded have given rise to four main conclusions regarding the con-
nection between war veterans, political culture in the interwar period and the 
rise of fascism.
First of all, veterans’ organisations were not necessarily politically orien-
tated or paramilitary leagues. They were, rather, normal civil society organ-
isations, pursuing the political and economic representation of veterans, war 
invalids, or war widows and orphans, organising social and cultural events, or 
taking up functions in youth welfare or national education. The return of mil-
lions of veterans to a civil existence, to their prewar jobs and to their families, 
placed unprecedented challenges and financial burdens on the combatant 
states. Apart from the war debts and the massive costs of reconstruction of 
devastated regions, state authorities were obliged to pay pensions to disabled 
veterans and to widows and war orphans.18 The concept of ‘civil society’ will 
and the Urban Experience in Britain and Germany, 1917–1921 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); 
Benjamin Ziemann, Front und Heimat: Ländliche Kriegserfahrungen im südlichen Bayern 
1914–1923 (Essen: Klartext, 1997).
16 Published as: Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman ed., The Great War and Veterans’ 
Internationalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
17 Alessandro Salvador and Anders G. Kjøstvedt, ed., New Political Ideas in the Aftermath of 
the Great War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
18 Audoin-Rouzeau and Prochasson, ed., Sortir de la Grande Guerre; Richard Bessel,  Germany 
after the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Bruno Cabanes, La victoire en-
deuillée: La sortie de guerre des soldats français, 1918–1920 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004); 
Deborah Cohen, The War Come Home : Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939 
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in this context need to be considered in a historical context. A modern-day 
definition which presupposes high standards for ‘civil society’ and excludes 
everything ‘military’ in background and style, does not quite fit to the political 
and cultural conditions of the interwar period.19
A second aspect of this civil society engagement of veterans’ organisations 
consists of their active involvement in war commemorations. The First World 
War played an immense role in the commemorative culture of next to all 
European countries after 1918. The ‘cult of the fallen’ and the establishment 
of national monuments, most notably the tombs of Unknown Soldiers, cen-
tred on the war veterans as the living representatives of the generation which 
fought and died for their country, and which deserved the fatherland’s eternal 
gratitude.20 The elevation of war commemoration ceremonies to a factor of 
national unity was, however, not everywhere as successful. In Germany, the 
protracted debates about the interpretation and meaning of war, wartime ex-
perience, and defeat precluded a unitary discourse about the First World War 
and severely hampered the legitimacy of the German Republic.21
The nature and development of international reconciliation can be dis-
cerned as a third result of recent interest in veterans’ organisations. French, 
 British, and German veterans’ leagues found a common understanding about 
the shared suffering in the trenches of the Great War and agreed upon joint 
commemoration ceremonies. The war experience and the firm conviction 
never to wage war again formed the backbone of a profoundly felt pacifism 
in many  veterans’ organisations. They did purposively meet their former 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Martina Salvante, ‘Italian Disabled Veter-
ans between Representation and Experience,’ in Men After War, ed. Stephen McVeigh and 
Nicola Cooper (New York: Routledge, 2013), 111–129.
19 Jürgen Kocka, ‘Civil Society in Historical Perspective,’ in Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives, 
ed. John Keane (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), 37–50; Frank Trentmann, 
 ‘Introduction,’ in Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and 
 British History, ed. Frank Trentmann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 3–46.
20 Bruno Cabanes, ‘Les vivants et les morts : La France au sortir de la Grande Guerre,’ in Sortir 
de la Grande Guerre, 27–45; Ken Inglis, ‘Entombing Unknown Soldiers : From  London and 
Paris to Baghdad,’ History and Memory 5, no. 2 (1993): 7–31; Oliver Janz, Das symbolische 
Kapital der Trauer: Nation, Religion und Familie im italienischen Gefallenenkult des Ersten 
Weltkriegs (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2009).
21 Nicolas Beaupré, Das Trauma des großen Krieges 1918–1932/33 (Darmstadt: wbg, 2009); 
Sabine Behrenbeck, ‘Zwischen Trauer und Heroisierung: Vom Umgang mit  Kriegstod 
und  Niederlage nach 1918,’ in Kriegsende 1918: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Jörg 
 Duppler and Gerhard Paul Gross (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 315–339; Benjamin 
 Ziemann,  Contested Commemoration: Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political 
 Culture  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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 adversaries on the former battlefields and on the war cemeteries of Flanders 
and Northern France and actively involved the youth in exchange and recon-
ciliation programmes. Initiatives like the German Kriegsgräberfürsorge [care of 
war graves] and student exchanges were based on such sentiments.22 For sure, 
these  reconciliation  measures and initiatives were not confined to left-wing, 
 socialist-internationalist, or genuinely pacifist veterans’ organisations. Musso-
lini used the international network of veterans’ organisations for the interests of 
Italian foreign policy, and the Nazi regime and its  Nationalsozialistische Krieg-
sopferversorgung [nskov; National Socialist War Victim's Care]  institution 
actively maintained close contacts with right-wing and conservative veterans’ 
organisations in France and Britain as late as 1938.23
Fourth, the international and pacifist view of veterans’ organisations was 
expressed in their commitment to civil society of the interwar period. The 
veterans’ organisations from the former Entente countries soon formed an 
international federation, called the Fédération Interalliée des Anciens Combat-
tants (fidac). Ongoing normalisation and reconciliation efforts resulted 
in the founding of the so-called Conférence Internationale des Associations 
de Mutilés et Anciens Combattants (ciamac) in 1925: this international 
 federation of  veterans’ organisations did include representatives from the 
former  Central  Powers. Both international federations spoke up for peace, 
 disarmament, a system of international arbitration, and a general climate of 
 international understanding. Their influence on the League of Nations, the 
International  Labour Organisation, and other international organisations of 
that time found its summit in coordinated fidac and ciamac actions at the 
Geneva disarmament conference in 1932–1934.24
22 Susanne Brandt, Vom Kriegsschauplatz zum Gedächtnisraum: Die Westfront 1914–1940 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000); Christian Weiß, ‘“Soldaten des Friedens”: Die pazifistischen 
Veteranen und Kriegsopfer des Reichsbundes und ihre Kontakte zu den französischen 
anciens combattants 1919–1933,’ in Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 
 1918–1939, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005) 183–204, 
here: 192–201.
23 Martina Salvante, ‘The Italian Associazione Nazionele Mutilati e Invalidi di Guerra and its 
International Liaisons in the Post Great War Era,’ in The Great War and Veterans’ Interna-
tionalism, ed. Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 162–183; Holger Skor, Brücken über den Rhein: Frankreich in der Wahrnehmung und 
Propaganda des Dritten Reiches, 1933–1939 (Essen: Klartext, 2011), 203–277; Claire Moreau 
Trichet, Henri Pichot et l’Allemagne de 1930 à 1945 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004).
24 Thomas Richard Davies, The Possibilities of Transnational Activism: The Campaign for 
Disarmament between the Two World Wars (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Antoine Prost and Jay 
Winter, René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
 9Editorial Introduction
fascism 6 (2017) 1-11
<UN>
The cultural and discursive aspects of fascism and fascist ideological views 
have been historiographically en vogue in recent years.25 However, the subse-
quent emphasis on war commemoration, the cult of the First World War, its 
soldiers, and ‘front experience’ did not always take into account the perspec-
tive of the actual war veterans and their organisations. As a result of this, the 
historiography of fascism seems to reproduce fascist propaganda claims that 
the fascist movements represented ‘the front soldiers’, without the appropriate 
empirical background to assess the links between war veterans and fascism.
When veterans’ organisations directly influenced politics, they could either 
recommend voting for a fascist party or have veterans’ representatives them-
selves run for parliament or for a political office on behalf of the party or move-
ment. An indirect factor is the shared responsibility of veterans for the creation 
of a political culture in which fascist movements could prosper and flourish 
later. If veterans’ organisations directly or indirectly were part of tendencies to-
wards a ‘brutalised’ or ‘militarised’ style and rhetoric of politics, or a ‘culture of 
defeat’, and thereby contributed to the rise of fascism, this contrasts sharply to 
their activities as internationally orientated and pacifistic civil society actors. 
Veteran initiatives for international reconciliation, joint commemorations and 
the efforts towards a lasting peace in Europe would at first sight counter fascist 
movements and their demands in the field of foreign policy.
 Scope and Content of this Special Issue
The objective of this special issue is to provide a better understanding of the 
contradictory roles played by veterans’ organisations. The comparative ap-
proach allows to debunk generalising statements about veterans as main 
 supporters and advocates of fascist parties and movements by drawing on 
counter-examples and by elaborating on the large cultural and discursive di-
versity of veterans’ organisations, even within one country and one cultural 
context. Some veterans’ associations supported a newly established authori-
tarian dictatorship, others invigorated the democratic system, while aggravat-
ing political tensions despite best intentions, or adopted a combination of 
these action repertoires. Each contribution will summarise the findings and 
insights from the most recent historiography in each country for the history 
25 Constantin Iordachi, ed., Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives (London: Rout-
ledge, 2010); Sven Reichardt, ‘Neue Wege der vergleichenden Faschismusforschung,’ 
 Mittelweg 36 (2007): 9–25; Thomas Schlemmer and Hans Woller, ed., Der Faschismus in 
Europa: Wege der Forschung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014).
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of veterans and their direct and indirect involvement in the ‘brutalisation of 
politics’ and the rise of fascism.
Similarly, several factors identified in the contributions draw the attention 
to productive new approaches and directions of research, which are not yet 
fully covered in national and internationally comparative studies. This applies 
in particular to the question of war memory and war commemoration as well 
as to generational aspects in the rise of fascist movements. For the understand-
ing of political violence after 1918, the contributions in this issue point to the 
experience of the First World War, the imagination of war experience and 
postwar traumatic violent conflicts, as possible factors.
In the first contribution to this special issue, Kristian Mennen addresses 
Germany, where National Socialism managed to mobilise a mass movement 
and engender support from civil society. Based on an overview of recent 
 research, Kristian Mennen’s case study on veterans’ organisations in the Wei-
mar Republic demonstrates their contrary understandings of collective war 
memory and their different definitions of ‘veteran’ and ‘front experience’. The 
evidence suggests that we should dismiss traditional views, according to which 
disappointed and politically radicalised war veterans formed the backbone of 
the Nazi membership. Mennen argues that the heroic and idealistic discourse 
of war which gained dominance in Weimar political culture, was produced by 
members of the ‘war youth generation’, who were actually too young to have 
fought in the war themselves.
John Paul Newman examines the political and ideological position of war 
veterans in the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The category of ‘war veterans’ 
is explicitly extended to members of the Chetnik irregular militias who fought 
for the ‘liberation’ of the ‘southern territories’ from 1912 onwards. Whereas of-
ficial ideology in the new multi-ethnic state was closely aligned to the Entente 
‘culture of victory’, in accordance with the dominant narrative of the Serbian 
war effort, many Yugoslav war veterans had fought in the armies of the  Central 
Powers.26 Newman argues that, although fascism was not a major part of the 
war veteran question in interwar Yugoslavia, war veterans and their ‘para- 
fascist’ associations were central to the identity and membership of the coun-
try’s fascist groups. This is demonstrated by a careful description of political 
discourse and ‘brutalisation’ in Yugoslavia and an analysis of the most relevant 
veterans’ organisations.
Constantin Iordachi and Blasco Sciarrino add another significant case study 
with their article about the relationship between patterns of demobilisation, 
26 John Paul Newman, Yugoslavia in the Shadow of War: Veterans and the Limits of State 
Building, 1903–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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fascism, and veterans’ activism in Romania. Romania belonged to the victo-
rious Entente powers and saw its wildest territorial ambitions miraculously 
fulfilled in 1918. The authors compare the process of war mobilisation and 
demobilisation in Romania in the years 1916–1920 to European-wide develop-
ments. Their contribution analyses the successful demobilisation and national 
legislation in favour of ex-servicemen in interwar Romania. In a comparison 
between veterans and the emergence of fascism in Italy and Romania, the au-
thors provide important suggestions concerning this connection in different 
national circumstances.
